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NOTE
A TECHNOLOGICAL UPGRADE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
AND BEYOND: FOCUSING ON A BROAD
INTERPRETATION OF THE STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT
Nicole R. Canale†
ABSTRACT
In the 21st century, it is more likely that your e-mail account will be
hacked than your home burglarized. E-mail is used by hundreds of
thousands of individuals, and this technological dependence only continues
to grow. Individuals want and need this electronic communication to be
protected. To satisfy this desire, Congress passed the Stored
Communications Act (“SCA”). This statute prohibits an individual from
obtaining or altering access to a wire or electronic communication while it
is in electronic storage. In other words, Congress designed the SCA to
protect an individual’s e-mail access. However, the SCA—passed in the
1980s—was not intended to deal with the evolving technology of e-mail.
Due to this upgrade in technology, the SCA is inconsistently applied
among the courts. Specifically, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have split over
the interpretation of the SCA in the cases of Anzaldua v. Northeast
Ambulance & Fire Protection District and Theofel v. Farey-Jones,
respectively. In Theofel, the Ninth Circuit held to a broad interpretation of
the SCA, while the Eighth Circuit in Anzaldua kept to a narrower
interpretation of the SCA. Consequently, the holdings of the courts were
completely different—only one holding that the e-mail was protected—even
though they dealt with similar issues.
There is a need for many areas of e-mail privacy protection to be
strengthened—or at the very least defined—so that individuals may take
precautions. This Note will address this missing gap in our technological
world and provide a recommendation that the SCA be broadly interpreted.
It will show that a narrow interpretation is not proper, as it avoids the
original intent of the SCA. This Note will show that a broad interpretation

† J.D. Candidate, 2018 Liberty University School of Law; Editor-in-Chief of the
Liberty University Law Review. I’d like to thank the Law Review Editorial Board for their
guidance and editing suggestions throughout the stages of writing this Note. I’d also like to
thank my friends and family for their encouragement and constant support.
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is also capable of being applied by all courts due to the canons of
construction in statutory interpretation. This interpretation will allow for a
solution that will be an adequate protection as technology changes in the
years to come.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2015, over 205 billion e-mails were sent and received per day, and this
figure is only expected to grow.1 By 2019, individuals will send more than
246 billion e-mails per day.2 E-mail has become an individual’s way to
communicate quickly, efficiently, and easily with anyone in the world.
While individuals seldom give thought to how an e-mail gets to the
recipient, most have strong views on who may view that e-mail. Most of
these individuals also have strong views about the importance of this
privacy in their everyday lives.3 They believe it is important—often very
important—that they maintain privacy and confidentiality in commonplace
activities of their lives.4
This Note will focus on Title II of the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (“ECPA”): The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), and its
application to individuals maintaining privacy and confidentially with their
e-mail. It will begin with an analysis of the ECPA, the SCA, and the
legislative history behind these Acts. This Note will explain how the SCA
relates to the issue of e-mail with its phrase, “electronic storage for backup
purposes,” and how courts have interpreted this language differently to
afford e-mail protection only when it is interpreted broadly.
In Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire Protection District, 793 F.3d
822 (8th Cir. 2015), and Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir.
2004), both courts interpreted “electronic storage for backup purposes”
from the viewpoint of current technology, rather than looking at technology
back with the SCA was enacted in the 1980’s. Although looking at
technology from the same view, and under similar facts, the two courts took

1. THE RADICATI GROUP, INC., E-mail Statistics Report, 2015-2019,
http://radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Email-Statistics-Report-2015-2019Executive-Summary.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and
RESEARCH
CENTER
(May
20,
2015),
Surveillance,
PEW
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-andsurveillance/.
4. Id. 93% of adults say that being in control of who can get information about them is
important; 74% feel this is “very important,” while 19% say it is “somewhat important.” Id.
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very different approaches to their interpretation of the phrase. Anzaldua,
interpreting the phrase narrowly, concluded the e-mail was not protected.
Theofel, holding to a broad interpretation, found that the e-mail was
protected.
As such, there is a gap in privacy coverage under the SCA. This Note will
suggest a way Congress may interpret electronic storage to bridge that gap.
It will argue for a broad interpretation of the SCA, one that will be
applicable in the years to come.
II. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT AND THE STORED
COMMUNICATIONS ACT
As e-mail use is growing exponentially in the 21st century, an
individual’s electronic property increasingly needs to be protected from
prying eyes. This was Congress’ original intent when it passed 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2522—the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986.5 The
ECPA is made up of three titles: Title I (Wiretap Act), Title II (Stored
Communications Act), and Title III (Pen Register and Trap and Trace
Devices).6 It is ultimately the Stored Communications Act that primarily
protects an individual’s e-mail use.
A. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act
The ECPA was adopted to protect wire, oral, and electronic
communications that are being made, are in transit, and when they are
stored on computers.7 Title II: The Stored Communications Act,8 added
new statutory provisions that explicitly strengthened the protection of email by strengthening the privacy of stored electronic communications,
either before such a communication is transmitted to the recipient or after
it is delivered and stored as a copy.9

5. U.S. Department of Justice, Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA),
INFORMATION
SHARING
(July
30,
2013),
JUSTICE
https://it.ojp.gov/privacyliberty/authorities/statutes/1285.
6. Id.
7. Id. It applies to communication like e-mail, telephone conversations, and data
stored electronically. Id.
8. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-12 (West).
9. Offices of the United States Attorneys, 1061. Unlawful Access to Stored
STATES
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE,
Communications,
UNITED
https://www.justice.gov/usam/criminal-resource-manual-1061-unlawful-access-storedcommunications-18-usc-2701.
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B. The Stored Communications Act
1. Original Intent of the SCA
Congress’ original intent in passing the SCA was to address the growing
problem of unauthorized persons deliberately gaining access to, or
tampering with, electronic or wire communications that were not intended
to be available to the public.10 In light of this importance of
communications to interstate and foreign commerce, the SCA’s prevention
of unauthorized access to the systems used for such communication was for
a legitimate federal concern. 11
2. What is Protected by the SCA?
The opening section of the Stored Communications Act, § 2701, sets the
scope of an individual’s e-mail protection. § 2701(a) makes it an offense to
intentionally access without authorization, or to exceed an authorization to
access, an electronic communication service and thereby obtain, alter, or
prevent authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is
in electronic storage in such system.12 To ultimately understand what the
SCA protects, one must understand each of the Act’s integral elements: (1)
electronic communication service; (2) wire or electronic communication;
and (3) electronic storage.
a. Electronic storage13
The SCA protects communication if it is in electronic storage. § 2510(17)
of the ECPA defines electronic storage as: “(a) any temporary, intermediate
storage of a wire or electronic communication incidental to the electronic
transmission; or (b) any storage of such communication by an electronic
communication service for purposes of backup protection of such
communication.”14
Electronic storage focuses when, what, and why the communication was
stored. For the SCA to provide protection, the ECPA is concerned that the
wire or electronic communication is stored temporarily or intermediately,

10. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, H.R. Rep. No. 99-647, 62 (1986).
11. Id. at 63.
12. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A § 2701(a) (West) (emphasis added).
13. To avoid redundancy, this Note starts with the definition of element (3) “electronic
storage” because within this definition, both elements (1) and (2) are mentioned.
14. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(17) (West). This note
will have a focus on analyzing case law under Section 2510(17)(B) when courts have
interpreted the phrase “for the purposes of backup protection.”
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or that wire or electronic communication, stored by an electronic
communication service, was stored purposefully as backup protection.15
b. Wire or electronic communication
For the SCA to grant protection under § 2510(17)(A) and (B), the
communication must be wire or electronic in both instances. Section A of §
2510(17) is fairly straightforward in this application because it explicitly
protects “wire or electronic communication” if temporarily or immediately
placed in storage.16 However, section B of § 2510(17), does not explicitly
mention the words “wire or electronic communication.” Nevertheless,
communication under Section B must be in this form for the SCA to grant
protection. This is due to the words “such communication.” Courts have
determined that the phrase “such communication” is simply referencing §
2510(17)(A) when it uses the language “wire or electronic
communication.”17
Wire communication is defined by the ECPA as:
[A]ny aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of
facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of
wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin
and the point of reception (including the use of such connection
in a switching station) furnished or operated by any person
engaged in providing or operating such facilities for the
transmission of interstate or foreign communications or
communications affecting interstate or foreign commerce.18
Electronic communication is defined by the ECPA as:
[A]ny transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or
intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a
wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or photooptical

15. For the purposes of this Note, ultimately, the focus will be on whether an electronic
communication is stored for the purpose of backup protection and therefore, this section
will break down only 2510(17)(B). Section 2510(17)(A) is included for the interpretation and
understanding of the SCA as a whole and Section (B) in particular to the phrase “such
communication.”
16. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(7) (West).
17. Bailey v. Bailey, 2008 WL 324156, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2008). It does not also
include the requirement that the electronic communications be “incidental to the electronic
transmission.” If that were the case, there would be no need to write them as two separate
meanings. Id.
18. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(1) (West).
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system that affects interstate or foreign commerce, but does not
include—
(A) any wire or oral communication;
(B) any communication made through a tone-only paging
device;
(C) any communication from a tracking device (as defined in
section 3117 of this title); or
(D) electronic funds transfer information stored by a financial
institution in a communications system used for the electronic
storage and transfer of funds.19
c. Electronic Communication Service
The SCA’s protection does not apply until the wire or electronic
communication is stored by an electronic communication service.
Electronic communication service (“ECS”) is broadly defined as “any
service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or receive wire or
electronic communications.”20 Unless the wire or electronic communication
fits within this SCA protected category, only the Fourth Amendment will
protect the communication.21
d. For the purposes of backup protection
Finally, for the SCA to protect the wire or electronic communication that
has been stored by an ECS, the communication must have been stored for
the purposes of backup protection.22 The ECPA has not defined exactly
what “for the purposes of backup protection” means. Therefore, this
element of the SCA has been left to the interpretation of the courts.
Unfortunately, courts like the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have not been able
to discern Congress’ intent regarding this phrase, which has caused multiple
circuit splits as to what is protected under the SCA.23
III. E-MAIL IS PROTECTED UNDER THE SCA
Having defined the broad elements that must be met for the SCA to
grant protection: (1) an electronic communication service; (2) wire or

19. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(12) (West).
20. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(15) (West).
21. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1213 (2004).
22. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510(17)(B) (West).
23. See infra Section V.
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electronic communication; and (3) electronic storage,24 this Note will now
apply the SCA’s scope of protection to e-mail.
The SCA protects any electronic communication when it is a wire or
electronic communication and stored by an ECS. This includes the
transmission of e-mail. E-mail is protected because it is a form of electronic
communication, that when stored by an ECS, can meet the definition of
electronic storage if stored for the proper purposes. It is this last
requirement, the purpose of why the e-mail was stored, which causes courts
to continue to have difficulty determining the SCA’s scope of protection to
e-mail in the 21st century.
A. E-mail as an Electronic Communication
The definition of electronic communication is broad enough to include
e-mail. For example, almost all internet communications qualify as
electronic communications.25 As such, “there can be no doubt that [the
definition of electronic communication] is broad enough to encompass email communications.”26
B. E-mail is Stored by an Electronic Communication Service
Both unopened and opened e-mails are stored by electronic
communication services. When e-mail is received, but sits unopened on the
internet service provider’s (“ISP”) server, the ISP is acting as a provider of
ECS. 27 Internet service providers are companies such as Comcast Xfinity,
At&T internet, or Version Fios,28 and will receive the e-mail from e-mail
clients or web mail. Therefore, the e-mail is protected under the SCA by the
ISP.
The protections under the SCA are not as clear-cut for opened e-mails.
Traditionally, courts reasoned that when an individual left a copy of an
already-accessed e-mail stored on a server, the e-mail no longer fell under

24. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
25. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 876 (9th Cir. 2002).
26. In re Application of United States, 416 F. Supp. 2d 13, 16 (D.D.C. 2006).
27. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1215 (2004); see also In re Doubleclick
Inc., Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497, 511 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
28. 20
Top
Internet
Service
Providers,
PRACTICALECOMMERCE,
https://www.practicalecommerce.com/20-Top-Internet-Service-Providers.
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an electronic communication service; rather, the e-mail was just in remote
storage.29
However, this line of reasoning changed with Theofel v. Farey-Jones. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that all e-mails held by a server were protected
under the ECS rules until “the underlying message [] expired in the normal
course.”30 This was regardless of whether the e-mail had been opened or
not.31
While the SCA broadly protects ECS storage, it is not designed to protect
the privacy of all Internet communications.32 The ECS rules require that, for
the SCA’s scope of protection to be granted, the ECS must be accessed
without permission, leading to the alteration of electronic communication
in electronic storage.33
C. E-mail is Electronic Storage
Since e-mail is an electronic communication that may be stored by an
ECS, the only element left to prove that e-mail is electronic storage (and
thus protected under the SCA) is whether it was stored as electronic storage
in either: (1) temporary, intermediate storage, or (2) for the purposes of
backup protection.
1. When is an E-mail Protected as Temporary, Intermediate Storage?
“There is no question that the SCA protects unopened e-mails stored on
e-mail servers before they are delivered to, and opened by, their
recipients.”34 The SCA applies in instances such as these because unopened
e-mails fall into § 2510(17)(A) and are in “temporary, intermediate storage”
when pending delivery.35

29. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator's
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1217 (2004). The Stored
Communications Act does have protections in place for remote storage (RCS), but they are
not at issue in this Note since the change with Theofel.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1214.
33. Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C.A § 2701(a) (West).
34. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn't Violate the SCA,
AND
BOONE,
HAYNES
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
35. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn't Violate the SCA,
AND
BOONE,
HAYNES
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2. When is an E-mail Protected For the Purposes of Backup
Protection?
Once opened, server-resident e-mails are no longer protected by the SCA
under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(A) because in Cruz Lopez v. Pena the court
found that this type of e-mail is “no longer stored incident to
transmission.”36 The question then is whether opened e-mails are protected
under 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B), “for purposes of backup protection.”37
This status for opened e-mails remains unclear. Courts under the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits struggle with the fact that neither the SCA nor the ECPA
define “backup protection.”38 Courts like Theofel have held that yes, e-mail
opened on an ISP is stored for the purposes of backup protection. However,
courts like Anzaldua, have held the opposite and found that because the email was not stored for backup protection, it was not electronic storage, and
therefore, not granted protection under the SCA. This Note will discuss
these cases, their holdings, and argue that Theofel’s broad interpretation
illuminates the intent of the SCA, yet still grants adequate protection to
individuals as technology advances in e-mail.
IV. THE SCA IN A 21ST CENTURY CONTEXT
When Congress enacted the SCA, technology was vastly different than
the digital landscape individuals face today. In the 21st century, access to email servers is broader than it was in the 1980s.
Generally speaking, there are two types of e-mail accounts: (1) e-mail
clients and (2) web mail.39 E-mail clients are programs such as Microsoft
Office or Thunderbird.40 Web mail is provided through browsers like
Gmail, Yahoo!, or Hotmail.41 With the expansion of these web-based
programs, e-mail has become easier to access and store for the individual.
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
36. Id. (citing Lopez I, at *4).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)(B).
38. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn't Violate the SCA,
AND
BOONE,
HAYNES
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
39. Web
Mail
v.
Email
Clients,
BASICCOMPUTERINFORMATION.CA,
http://www.basiccomputerinformation.ca/web-mail-vs-email-clients/ (last visited Oct. 24,
2016).
40. Id.
41. Id.
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As such, the SCA has been interpreted to no longer covers certain e-mail
storage, leaving individuals without critical privacy protection. To help fix
this, Congress enacted amendments for e-mail privacy throughout the
years, but such a patch will be insufficient to account for upcoming
technological advances.
A. A Technological Upgrade in E-mail
When the SCA was created in 1986, public e-mail services were in their
infancy and individuals only used e-mail clients.42 When using an e-mail
client, the individual’s e-mail resided permanently on the ISP’s server.43
Therefore, to access the e-mail, an individual needed to connect with the
ISP server and download messages.44 Subscribers connected to private ISP
networks though phone lines and they read e-mails on their personal
computers.45
In contrast, today, 56% of people use webmail services such as Hotmail,
Gmail, or Yahoo! e-mail, over any other e-mail service.46 In fact, the first
webmail service, Hotmail, was not created until 1996—ten years after the
SCA was enacted.47 When an individual uses a webmail service, he can
check for e-mail messages on any computer that has a web browser
installed.48 To retrieve those e-mails, the individual only has to go to the
web browser and find the webmail service.49 Once at the service, all the

42. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn't Violate the SCA,
AND
BOONE,
HAYNES
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx, (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
43. Web-Based Email Vs. ISP, IT STILL WORKS, http://itstillworks.com/webbased-emailvs-isp-3867.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn't Violate the
AND
BOONE,
SCA,
HAYNES
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
46. John B. Horrigan, Use of Cloud Computing Applications and Services, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (Sept. 12, 2008), http://www.pewinternet.org/2008/09/12/use-of-cloud-computingapplications-and-services/.
RESEARCH
CENTER,
47. World
Wide
Web
Timeline,
PEW
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/03/11/world-wide-web-timeline/ (last visited Oct. 24,
2016).
48. Web-Based E-mail Vs. ISP, IT STILL WORKS, http://itstillworks.com/webbased-emailvs-isp-3867.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
49. Id.
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individual has to do is log into the service, and the browser downloads the
e-mail.50 “In the absence of an e-mail client, messages are not downloaded
to the user’s personal device and remain on the server until expressly
deleted.”51
B. The E-mail Privacy Act of 2016
When the SCA was passed, Congress could not have foreseen
technological advances such as webmail. As a result, when e-mail evolved, it
left individuals with gaps in their privacy protection.52 Accordingly, leading
individuals in cyberspace law have said, “[i]t is time for Congress to step in
and be more specific as to what stored communications means, and at the
very least, make references to current technologies.”53
In 2015, the House tried to be more specific by passing on to the Senate
the E-mail Privacy Act.54 This amendment to the ECPA, among other
things, “prohibit[s] a provider of remote computing service or electronic
communication service to the public from knowingly divulging to a
governmental entity the contents of any communication that is in electronic
storage” and it will eliminate the difference in stored communications,
whether such communications had been stored for fewer than, or more
than, 180 days.55
However, the E-mail Privacy Act is still under the Senate’s review.56 Even
if both the House and Senate pass the Act, courts will still need explicit
guidance on how to define electronic storage as technology advances
quickly in the years to come. The E-mail Privacy Act will only clear up
certain, narrow privacy issues. It will still leave several questions and
conflicts regarding the definition of electronic storage for backup purposes

50. Id.
51. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn't Violate the SCA,
AND
BOONE,
HAYNES
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
52. Kristen L. Burge, Circuit Split Creates Data Protection Uncertainty, LITIGATION
NEWS
(Nov.
11,
2015),
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/111115-electronicstorage-protection.html (last visited Oct. 5th, 2016).
53. Id.
54. E-mail Privacy Act, H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015).
55. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (West) (This section contains the old 180-day rule. If
the E-mail Privacy Act passes in the Senate, it will be removed).
56. E-mail Privacy Act, H.R. 387, 115th Cong. (2017-2018). Found at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/387.
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unanswered. As a result, courts will remain split at both the federal and the
state level.57
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE DEFINITION OF ELECTRONIC STORAGE FOR
BACKUP PURPOSES
The most notable split to date regards the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.
When faced with nearly the same factual situation and issue—whether an
individual’s e-mails were protected by the SCA—the two circuits reached
opposite conclusions.58 Each circuit analyzed whether the e-mail was stored
for backup purposes under the electronic storage definition of 18 U.S.C. §
2510(17)(B), but only the Ninth Circuit concluded that the e-mails were
protected under the SCA.59
The Ninth Circuit determined the standard definition of electronic
storage for backup purposes in its 2004 decision, Theofel v. Farey-Jones.60
There, the court held to a broad interpretation of electronic storage. It
allowed e-mail to be protected under the SCA until the underlying message
expired in the normal course of business because after that it would no
longer be serving a backup function.61 The court also found that e-mails,
which had been received, read, and left on the server, were stored for
purposes of backup protection, and therefore were within the protection of
the SCA.62
However, under the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Anzaldua v. Northeast
Ambulance & Fire Protection District,63 the SCA may no longer protect
stored communication a user considers saved as a backup.64 The plaintiff in
that case relied on the Ninth Circuit’s Theofel interpretation of electronic
storage.65 He argued that his e-mail was protected under the SCA because it
still served a backup purpose.66
The Eighth Circuit disagreed. The court noted that the “electronic
storage” requirement is commonly misunderstood because the statutory

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Burge, supra note 52.
Id.
Id.
Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1070.
See generally id.
Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance & Fire Prot. Dist., 793 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2015).
Burge, supra note 52.
Id.
Id.
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definition is much narrower than its name suggests.67 The court
acknowledged that, under common parlance, while the plaintiff’s e-mail
remained on the server it would serve as a “backup” for the sender; it no
longer qualified as electronic storage under the SCA.68 The Eighth Circuit
held this way because the plaintiff had no reason to access the purported
backup copy after the e-mail had been successfully delivered.69
As a result of these split decisions, individuals must “be very careful
because [they] cannot expect to know how the court is going to interpret
stored communications, especially if the content is stored in the e-mail
system and accessible by the sender of the message.”70 To minimize the risk
of litigation, “it is crucial to implement policies limiting or prohibiting
access to personal accounts to avoid stored communication disputes.71
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision
The Ninth Circuit began first by interpreting the Stored
Communications Act “in light of the common law.”72 The court dissected
the SCA’s definition of electronic storage into two parts: “(A) any
temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic communication
incidental to the electronic transmission . . . and (B) any storage of such
communication by an electronic communication service for the purposes of
backup protection of such communication.”73 The court focused on part (B)
of the definition: whether the e-mail was stored for purposes of backup
protection.74
The court viewed the subsection under the plain language of the Act.75
Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, the SCA offers protection when
the purpose of storing a message on an ISP server after delivery is to provide
a second copy of the message in the event that the user needed to download

67. Id.
68. Kristen L. Burge, Circuit Split Creates Data Protection Uncertainty, LITIGATION
NEWS
(Nov.
11,
2015),
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/111115-electronicstorage-protection.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2016).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1072.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075.

748

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:735

it again.76 The court rejected a Third Circuit interpretation in Fraser v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.77 that backup protection included only temporary
backup storage pending delivery and not any form of post transmission
storage.78
The court noted that subsection (B) of the definition of electronic storage
must include post transmission storage because “subsection (B) does not
distinguish between intermediate and post transmission storage,” as
subsection (A) does, and “since temporary backup storage pending
transmission would already seem to qualify as ‘temporary, intermediate
storage’ with the meaning of subsection (A), subsection (B) would then be
rendered superfluous.”79 It is only when the underlying message has expired
in the normal course that any copy will have thereby expired and would no
longer be performing any backup function.80 It is only then that the e-mail
would not be protected by the SCA.
The court held that there was no dispute that messages remaining “on
[the] server after delivery [were] stored ‘by an electronic communication
service’” whether or not they had been previously delivered.81 The messages
therefore served a backup purpose and were covered by the SCA.82
B. The Eighth Circuit’s Decision
The Eighth Circuit determined that while the district court erred in
finding that the defendant had authorized access to the plaintiff’s e-mail
account, he was still not afforded protection under the SCA because his emails were not electronic storage within the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation
of the Act.83 The court held that the plaintiff’s e-mails did not serve any
backup function merely because copies of them remained on a webmail

76. Id. The court noted that “the mere fact that a copy could serve as a backup does not
mean it is stored for that purpose.” Id. at 1076 (emphasis omitted). There are “many
instances were an ISP could hold messages not in electronic storage,” such as an “e-mail sent
to or from the ISP’s staff, or messages a [individual] has flagged for deletion from the server.”
Id. at 1076.
77. Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
78. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1075.
79. Id. at 1075-76.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1075-77.
82. Id.
83. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 838.
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server.84 The apparent test in the Eighth Circuit for serving a backup
function is whether the user has “reason to believe that they may need to
access an additional copy of the file in the future.”85 The plaintiff only
argued that copies existed and did not further his argument by discussing a
future need to access it.86 As such, the e-mails did not fall within the
protection of the SCA according to the Eighth Circuit.87
VI. ANZALDUA AND THEOFEL IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER CIRCUITS
Due to the 21st century changes in technology, now, more than ever, the
SCA needs to be interpreted to include this growing expanse of electronic
communication. Today, “people store e-mails by leaving them in their
inboxes, sent mailbox, or deleted folders, where they can keep copies
indefinitely.”88 By classifying these communications as electronic storage,
the Theofel court expanded protection to e-mails stored on web-based
servers.89
Within the context of other circuits, one can not only see how courts
have agreed and disagreed with the Theofel holding, but it becomes
apparent that the interpretation of the SCA must be held in a broad
manner. This broad interpretation allows for the protection of e-mails and
is within the original intent of the protections guaranteed by the SCA.90
Otherwise, individuals will be left with a wide gap in critical privacy
protections.

84. Id. at 842. An e-mail service that kept permanent copies of temporary messages
could not be described as “backing up” those messages. Id. (quoting Theofel v. Farey-Jones,
359 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004)).
85. Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and A Legislator's
Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1218 (2004).
86. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 840, 842. Anzaldua claimed his draft e-mail to Dr. Tan was in
temporary storage and therefore covered under 18 U.S.C. 2510(17)(A). Such a situation is
beyond the scope of this note (18 U.S.C. 2510(17)(B)).
87. Id. at 842.
88. Kristen L. Burge, Circuit Split Creates Data Protection Uncertainty, LITIGATION
NEWS
(Nov.
11,
2015),
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/111115-electronicstorage-protection.html (last visited Oct. 5th, 2016).
89. Id.
90. See supra Section II.B.1.
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A. A Narrow Interpretation: Cases in Agreement with Anzaldua
Many courts have followed Anzaldua and interpreted the SCA in a
narrower light. The Central District of California in Crispin v. Christian
Audigier Inc. implicitly assumed that the plaintiff’s opened e-mail on his
webmail were not downloaded, and as such, it held that these e-mails were
not in backup storage and were not protected by the SCA’s § 2701(a)).91
Similarly, in Jennings v. Jennings, the court held that because the copy of the
e-mail was read and the webmail server was the only copy retained, there
was no “backup” under the SCA.92
B. A Broad Interpretation: Cases in Agreement with Theofel
A number of other courts have followed Theofel and interpreted the SCA
in a broad manner. The Central District of Illinois found that accessing
server e-mail copies fell under the SCA’s purview when the plaintiff
downloaded the e-mails to Outlook.93 Likewise, the Northern District of
Iowa held that a plaintiff who downloaded e-mails to Outlook on his laptop
computer properly alleged an SCA claim when defendants had accessed the
Exchange server copies.94
Courts that have interpreted the SCA under Theofel’s broader
interpretation have not just protected downloaded e-mail from clients, but
also e-mails opened on a webmail server. In Bailey v. Bailey, the plaintiff
brought a suit under the SCA when the defendant accessed two of his
Yahoo! e-mail accounts without permission.95 Agreeing with the reasoning
in Theofel, this court found that “the plain language of the [SCA] seem[ed]
to include e-mails received by the intended recipient where they remain
stored by an electronic communication service.”96 In Fischer v. Mount Olive
Lutheran Church Inc., the plaintiff sued the defendants under the SCA after
they accessed his Hotmail account by guessing his password.97 The court
cited the legislative history to hold “that Congress intended the [SCA] to

91. Crispin v. Christian Audigier Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2010).
92. Jennings v. Jennings, 736 S.E.2d 242, 245 (S.C. 2012).
93. See Shefts v. Petrakis, No. 10-cv-1104, 2011 WL 5930469, at *2, *6 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 29,
2011).
94. See Cornerstone Consultants, Inc. v. Prod. Input Sols., L.L.C., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1029,
1032-33, 1055 (N.D. Iowa 2011).
95. Bailey v. Bailey, No. 07-11672, 2008 WL 324156, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2008).
96. Id. at *6.
97. Fischer v. Mount Olive Lutheran Church, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 916-17, 920
(W.D. Wis. 2002).
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cover the exact situation in this case.”98 In its determination of Fischer,
however, the court cited to nothing in its opinion to suggest that the
plaintiff’s e-mails had been downloaded to a client; it can be presumed that
the e-mails stayed on the webmail server after being read by the plaintiff.99
The broad interpretation was most recently followed in 2013. In Cheng v.
Romo, the court held that previously opened web-based e-mails were in
“electronic storage” as defined by SCA because the Act did not specify for
whose purposes the backup protection must be intended.100 The e-mail need
only be backed up.101
C. Courts May Have Followed Anzaldua Due to the E-mail Type
Some analysts have tried to downplay the circuit split and reconcile the
cases by explaining that each court’s reasoning as to its interpretation of the
SCA was due to the different type of e-mail account used in each case.102 In
Theofel, the plaintiff’s e-mail was on an ISP—a client e-mail.103 In contrast,
the plaintiff in Anzaldua used Gmail as his e-mail provider.104
While Anzaldua’s interpretation may be the court’s attempt to interpret
the SCA under the technological changes to e-mail accounts, the heart of
the discrepancy in the Act’s interpretation is not the type of e-mail provider,
it is purpose for why the e-mail has been backed up. Since the SCA fails to
define what a proper backup purpose is, the type of e-mail account used
cannot be the only factor a court uses to interpret the SCA’s scope. Courts
such as the Eastern District of Michigan and the United States District

98. Fischer, 207 F. Supp. at 925–26 (citing S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 36 (1986) (e-mail
subscriber would violate SCA’s § 2701(a) by accessing other subscribers’ e-mails).
99. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn’t Violate the SCA,
AND
BOONE,
HAYNES
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx, (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
100. Cheng v. Romo, No. 11—10007—DJC, 2013 WL 6814691, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 20,
2013).
101. Id.
102. Pierre Grosdidier, When Hacking an E-mail Account Doesn’t Violate the SCA,
AND
BOONE,
HAYNES
http://www.haynesboone.com/~/media/files/attorney%20publications/2013/law360%20_wh
en_hacking_an_e-mail_account_doesnt_violate_the_sca.ashx, (last visited Oct. 24, 2016); see
also Martha K. Gooding and Isabelle M. Carrillo, LAWYER? TRESPASSER?: How An Overly
Broad Subpoena Can Turn Civil Discovery Into Snooping In Violation Of Federal Law, ABTL
REPORT (Fall 2003), http://www.abtl.org/report/oc/abtlocvol5no3.pdf.
103. Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1071.
104. Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 827.
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Court, District of Massachusetts are willing to be flexible in applying the
SCA to warrant e-mail protection.105
VII. RECOMMENDING A MOVEMENT TOWARDS A
BROAD INTERPRETATION OF THE SCA
To determine what may be included as electronic storage, it is important
to remember the original intent of the SCA. It was created to prevent
unauthorized access “[b]ecause looking at another’s e-mail is generally
considered to be bad conduct, [and] courts have a tendency to want to find
a violation.”106 The SCA must be interpreted under a broad interpretation
like that of Theofel to keep the original intent of the Act.
The SCA is notoriously hard to interpret.107 Even after centuries of
judicial and scholarly effort, “[t]he hard truth of the matter is that American
courts have no intelligible, generally accepted, and consistently applied
theory of statutory interpretation.”108 Nevertheless, the courts have been
tasked to interpret statutes like the SCA and must do so to protect the
privacy of individuals. Without a definition, as to what electronic storage
for a backup purpose is, courts have scant direction on how to interpret the
SCA in any context, let alone in the current digital age. The SCA should be
uniformly interpreted among courts, preventing circuit splits like those of
Theofel and Anzaldua, and thereby adequately protecting the privacies of
individuals in this technological age by giving them a standard to which
they will expect their e-mail communications to be safeguarded.
A. Canons of Construction
Despite the inherent difficulty that comes with statutory interpretation,
the “canons of construction” provide the courts with guidance on how
statutes should be interpreted. Accordingly, courts should use these canons,
and use them correctly, in interpreting the SCA.
105. Id.
106. Jannis E. Goodnow, Party Held Liable for Unauthorized E-mail Access, LITIGATION
NEWS
(Apr.
25,
2014),
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/042514-storedcommunications-act.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2016).
107. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging
the difficulty in interpreting the Act because “the ECPA was written prior to the advent of
the Internet and the World Wide Web”).
108. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
The Foundation Press 1994).
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A court may only apply these canons if the statute is found to be
ambiguous.109 Courts have generally held that a statute is ambiguous when
reasonably well-informed persons could understand the language in either
of two or more senses.110 Here, the SCA’s language for “backup purposes”
has quite clearly been understood in two senses because the courts in
Theofel and Anzaldua came to two opposite conclusions regarding the
language. Therefore, this part of the SCA is ambiguous and it is appropriate
to apply the canons of construction.
The canons of construction are theories, which guide the methods and
sources used in statutory interpretation.111 “The three dominant theories of
how statutes should be interpreted—new textualism, intentionalism, and
pragmatism—are each comprised of a collection of assertions about which
interpretive rules are appropriate.”112
When interpreting a statute, the interpreter will choose a particular
canon due to his or her preferred methodology.113 “When a legislature
enacts a statute, its members have certain ideas about how those words
convey meaning.”114 “
Regardless of the theory of interpretation applied, a broad interpretation
of the SCA should prevail. Each of the three theories militates for the
conclusion that the Theofel court came to—that the SCA should protect email even after it has been sent and simply stays on the server. This is in
contrast to the Anzaldua court’s narrow interpretation of the SCA wherein
an e-mail that is simply left on a server does not serve a backup purpose and
therefore is not afforded protection under the SCA.115
109. Under the "plain-meaning" rule, if the intention of the legislature is "so apparent
from the face of the statute that there can be no question as to its meaning, there is no need
for the court to apply canons of construction." Canons of Construction, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.encyclopedia.com/law/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/canonsconstruction (citing Overseas Educ. Ass'n v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 876 F.2d 960 (D.C.
Cir. 1989)).
110. Neelen v. Lucas, 24 Wis. 2d 262, 267 (1964).
111. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98
GEORGETOWN L.J. 341, 343 (2010).
112. Id.
113. Id. While an interpreter’s preferred method may be used when looking at the
‘canons of construction’ the first time, once a court interprets the statute, other courts
usually will not go through the exercise again, but rather will enforce the statute as
interpreted by the other court. Statutory Construction, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/statutory_construction.
114. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98
GEORGETOWN L.J. 341, 343 (2010).
115. See supra Section VI.A.
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1. New Textualism
For new textualists, the statutory language itself . . . is the best evidence of
legislative intent.”116 Under the new textualist theory, the courts look to
linguistic inferences that encourage interpreters to follow the ordinary
usage of text, unless the legislature has itself defined the word or the phrase
has acquired a technical meaning.117 Because dictionaries report common
usage, the dictionary rule supports consulting widely used dictionary
definitions of terms the legislature has not defined.118
In applying this to the SCA, the legislature did not define and ordinary
usage of the text “backup protection.” Therefore, it is appropriate to look to
the dictionary definition of these words. Merriam-Webster defines
“backup” as, “one that serves as a substitute or support.”119 It also defines
protection as, “the act of protecting.”120 Merriam-Webster then defines
“protect” as, “to cover or shield from exposure, injury, damage, or
destruction.”121 Under new textualism then, “backup protection” is a
substitute, which is meant to cover or prevent something from destruction.
With this theory, the SCA will allow for e-mail to be protected when its
storage on a server is for the purpose of a substitute to shield the e-mail
from destruction.
New textualism allows “for the purpose of backup protection” to be
satisfied under both e-mail clients and webmail providers, even though the
storage of e-mail has changed. The storage of e-mail under an e-mail client
is active, one has to purposefully download the e-mail to view and save it.
116. Id. at 348.
117. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 228 (1994) (using ordinary
usage canon to hold that the Federal Communication Commission’s authority to “modify”
tariff requirements does not allow it to waive tariffs because “‘[m]odify,’ in [the Court’s]
view, connotes moderate change” and stating that “[i]t might be good English to say that the
French Revolution ‘modified’ the status of the French nobility—but only because there is a
figure of speech called understatement and a literary device known as sarcasm.”).
118. See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128 (1998) (consulting the Oxford
English Dictionary,
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, and Random House Dictionary of the
English Language
Unabridged for the meaning of the word “carry”).
(1828);
also
found
at
119. Backup,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/backup?utm_campaign=
sd&utm_medium=serp&utm_source=jsonld.
120. Protection, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (1828); also found at https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/protection.
121. Protect, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (1828); also found at https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/protecting.
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Webmail storage, on the other hand, is more passive because messages are
not downloaded to the user’s personal device; they simply remain stored on
the server until expressly deleted. However, this does not mean that the
purpose of the storage needs to change.
In order to be protected under the SCA, the e-mail, not only needs to be
stored for backup purposes, but also needs to be stored as electronic
storage. “To store” is defined as, “to place or leave in a location . . . for
preservation or later use or disposal.”122 Therefore, for an e-mail to be
stored, it must be left in a location for preservation or later use. With both
e-mail clients and webmail providers, it can be said that e-mail is stored.
For an e-mail client, e-mail is stored when the individual places the e-mail
on his personal device; this occurs the moment he downloads it for the use
of viewing the e-mail. With a webmail provider, e-mail can only be stored
on the server because it downloads the e-mail automatically to enable an
individual to view it right away. In leaving the e-mail on the server, an
individual stores it to simply preserve it (shown by the decision not to
delete it) or for future use in his work.
Whether e-mail is stored for the purpose of backup needs to be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis because an individual’s purpose is a subjective
argument. Nevertheless, the argument for protection under the SCA can be
made with both types of e-mail because in either case an e-mail may be held
as a substitute to shield it from destruction. With an e-mail client, an
individual will have initially downloaded the e-mail for the purpose of
viewing it, but an individual may decide to keep the e-mail so that she has a
second copy, or she may want to keep the information as a reminder.
Therefore, this would satisfy the definition of “backup purposes” under
Merriam-Webster, and therefore the definition of new textualism. Similarly,
an e-mail viewed on a webmail application may also serve as “backup
protection” under the statute even if it simply stays on the server because an
individual may choose to keep it on the server so that it is not lost.
Accordingly, new textualism lends itself to a broad interpretation of the
SCA by allowing e-mail simply stored on a server to be protected under the
SCA123 because it may be stored for a purpose within the definition of
“backup protection.”

122. The word storage is not defined within the SCA, so the dictionary is an appropriate
source. Store, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (1828); also found at https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/store.
123. See supra Section VI.B.
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2. Intentionalism
“

Intentionalist theories emphasize the realization of legislative intent as
the aim of statutory interpretation.”124 “Democratic values play a critical
part in shaping intentionalism.”125 “Statutes are the product of
representative democracy, and the will of the legislative body is what
constitutes ‘intent.’”126
The intentionalist theory, in its bent towards legislative intent, also lends
itself to a broad interpretation of the SCA. When legislators first wrote the
SCA, they intended it to protect against the growing problem of
unauthorized persons deliberately gaining access to, and sometimes
tampering with, electronic or wire communications that were not intended
to be available to the public.127 If the SCA is interpreted under the narrow
viewpoint of Anzaldua where an e-mail simply left on a webmail provider is
never be protected because an individual will not have any further use for
it,128 this e-mail will be open to tampering and unauthorized access because
the SCA will not protect it. An individual will be left vulnerable to the
whims of a hacker or unscrupulous individual.
However, this would not be the case if the SCA were held to the broad
interpretation of Theofel. Under a broad interpretation, e-mail is protected
when held by either an e-mail client or a webmail provider. Therefore, it
will stop the growing problem of unauthorized access to e-mail because the
individual will have a course of action against an individual who tampers
with his e-mail. In its focus on the legislature’s intent (which was to protect
individual privacy). This dominant theory of statutory interpretation lends
itself to a broad interpretation.
3. Pragmatism
“Pragmatic theories reflect a more dynamic and flexible view.”129
“[P]ragmatism relies on multiple supporting arguments rather than any
conclusive single argument such as statutory text, specific legislative intent,
imaginative reconstruction, legislative purpose, evolution of statute, or
current democratic, rule of law, and social values.”130 Pragmatism
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 62 (1986).
Anzaldua, 793 F.3d at 842.
Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98
GEORGETOWN L.J. 341, 349 (2010).
130. Id.
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recommends a broad interpretation of the SCA through the idea of
evolution and current social values.
The SCA—originally passed in the infancy of the internet—continues to
face criticism for its lack of protection for individuals. In order to help the
SCA evolve, Congress implemented two reforms: the E-mail Privacy Act131
and The Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of
2015.132 Both of these acts are very similar. Both seek to strengthen the need
for warrants and to remove the reliance on the definition of “electronic
storage,” which has confused lower courts.133 Both areas of reform show
that the legislature is trying to apply “electronic storage for backup
protection” in the SCA to the 21st century. This mentality is found in a
broad interpretation, not a narrow interpretation, as a broad interpretation
works to apply electronic storage to changing technology patterns, thereby
providing more protection to individuals.
Social consensus shows a need for more protection of individuals’ e-mail.
Most Americans have strong views about the importance of privacy in their
everyday lives.134 The majority of Americans believe it is important—often
very important—that they be able to maintain privacy and confidentiality in
commonplace activities of their lives.135 Americans are entitled to know
which of their personal items are protected from unauthorized access,136
and a broad interpretation of the SCA will allow for this deserved
protection. A broad interpretation would protect both an e-mail client and
a webmail provider. Therefore, individuals would know if their e-mail
would be protected from unwanted access. A universal allowance of a broad
SCA interpretation will align with the social consensus for privacy.
Therefore, pragmatism—the last of the major theories of statutory
interpretation—also militates for a broad interpretation in its use of

131. See supra Section IV.B.
132. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2015, H.R. 283 (114th
Cong. (2015)).
133. Richard M. Thompson II & Jared P. Cole, Stored Communications Act: Reform of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (May 19,
2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44036.pdf.
134. Mary Madden & Lee Raine, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security and
RESEARCH
CENTER
(May
20,
2015),
Surveillance,
PEW
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-andsurveillance/.
135. Id. 93% of adults say that being in control of who can get information about them is
important; 74% feel this is “very important,” while 19% say it is “somewhat important.” Id.
136. See generally United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (stating that
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of an e-mail message).
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textualism, legislative intent, the evolution of the SCA, and current social
values. As such, all three areas of statutory interpretation, when applied to
the SCA, lend themselves to a broad interpretation.
B. Congress Can Ensure a Broad Interpretation of the SCA.
In the near future, Congress should implement reforms to ensure a broad
interpretation of the SCA. This will explicitly enhance e-mail protection. In
his article published in the Harvard Law Review, Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz argues that (1) Congress can and should help select the tools
for interpreting federal statutes, (2) that it has the constitutional power to
do so, and (3) that it would be wise to exercise this power.137 While
Congressional enactment of interpretive strategies tends to be rare,
tentative, and ad hoc, it may be done through three proposals: dictionary
definitions, canons, and legislative history.138 All three of these methods
may be used to ensure that Congress interprets the SCA in a broad manner
to allow the same of future courts.
1. Dictionary Definitions
Rosenkranz argues that the dictionary would relieve one form of
miscommunication because it would allow for a legislator to simply look up
a word he did not understand in a statute—thereby rendering a statute
more determinate.139 While not a total relief of statutory ambiguity, it would
be a step in the right direction. Congress could be free to define simply what
a backup purpose would be in future SCA reform.
2. Canons of Construction
Another option that Rosenkranz proposes is the use of the canons of
construction. Presented above, each of the three theories of construction
lend themselves to a broad interpretation of the SCA. However, Congress
could use clear statement rules in SCA reform, which would allow for
explicit ways to achieve certain goals.140 The statements could implement a
broad interpretation of the SCA that would cover technology changes in the
future. This would eliminate a great deal of uncertainty with respect to these
goals and leave all power over them squarely in the hands of Congress.141
137. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085, 2086 (2002).
138. Id. at 2147-51.
139. Id. at 2147.
140. Id. at 2149.
141. Id.
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3. Legislative History
The final proposal looks to legislative history. While a fierce debate rages
as to whether this is a proper way to interpret statutes, Congress does have
the power to say (and thus end this issue) what “for the purpose of
background protection” means.142 All it would take is one sentence:
“Backup protection shall include any . . .”143 While this may be initially seen
as a narrow interpretation, Congress could ensure, using the canons of
construction, that it is broadly constructed to cover future technological
advances. These options may be an answer to help ensure a broad
interpretation because they allow Congress to explicitly control how the
statute is interpreted, instead of allowing the inconsistencies that the SCA
now faces. It would allow the SCA to be controlled under an interpretation
granting privacy protection for technology now and in the future.
VIII. CONCLUSION: A BROAD INTERPRETATION MEANS
PROTECTION FOR YEARS TO COME
The Stored Communications Act, a part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, is a Congressional enactment intended to
protect against unauthorized access to electronic communications in
electronic storage—including both temporary storage and storage for the
purposes of backup protection.
The problem with the SCA lies in the definition of electronic storage
because Congress never defined what exactly “electronic storage for backup
protection” included. As a result, this led to a circuit split between the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits in the cases Anzaldua v. Northeast Ambulance &
Fire Protection District and Theofel v. Farey-Jones, respectively. Each court
came to an opposite conclusion as to whether e-mail was protected under
the SCA. Theofel allowed for a broad interpretation of backup protection,
an interpretation that would include protection for e-mail under e-mail
clients and webmail providers. However, Anzaldua worked with a more
narrow definition, and as a result, e-mail simply left on a webmail’s server
was not protected under the SCA. Given the growth of technology and the
individuals’ desire for protection, a narrow interpretation will not allow for
these needs. A broad interpretation, however, does.
The SCA needs to be universally interpreted under this broad viewpoint.
By looking to the canons of construction, courts may do interpret the SCA
in this broad manner. The three main interpretations—new textualism,
142. Id.
143. Rosenkranz, infra note 137, at 2150-51.
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intentionalism, and pragmatism—all speak to allowing for a broad
interpretation due to dictionary definitions, Congress’ original intent
behind the SCA, the Act’s evolution, and social consensus theories. All
showcase the need for more protection of e-mail.
Finally, and most importantly, a broad interpretation of the SCA, will
allow for the protection of e-mail in the years to come. A broad
interpretation will allow the SCA to incorporate e-mail as it changes
because it will allow for courts to take into account the original intent of
Congress, the privacy wants of individuals, and ultimately, the privacy
needs that individuals are entitled to in their everyday use of e-mail.

